I had meant to say something about the Human Terrain System's apparent dispute with MAJ Gant's One Tribe at a Time approach to the Afghan conflict. The HTS paper is reasonable, for example in its assertions that Afghan "tribes" are much more atomized than Iraqi ones, and will be much more difficult to leverage to create strategic effects. I haven't been to Afghanistan, so I can't opine as to whether or not they are correct about that; but I have worked with HTTs and HTAT-B in Iraq, and have been impressed on occasion with their work. Their reachback scholarship is not bad. On the other hand, MAJ Gant's actually been to Afghanistan and tried to do the thing he discusses; and as useful as I often found HTTs to be, I'm not sure that they yet rise to the level of expertise in these matters of, say, Special Forces with on-the-ground experience. That doesn't mean they're wrong and he's right; but I'd think we'd take our working assumption that he probably has a point, given his practical experience with the mission. HTS' concerns may point to complications, but even an atomized tribal structure still exists within an honor society, and there are ways to work honor societies even if you have to do it at a house-to-house and village-to-village level, rather than a tribe-to-tribe or region-to-region level. To the degree that HTS is right, in other words, it's a harder mission than MAJ Gant expects or than we had in Iraq; but it works in broadly the same way, though the unit on the ground will have to refine its approach in terms of its experience. The upside to go with that downside is this: if there aren't large-scale tribes that can be used as leverage points, there also isn't much danger that another unit on the other side of the country may be trying to leverage the tribal system in the opposite direction! You won't have to worry about having a tribe in your area pushed into hostility by something that another chain of command does well outside of your situational awareness: the atomized tribal/honor structure means that you'll be speaking to everyone who matters for your area. In any event, as with much of military science, I expect this is something that will have to be worked out in the field. You've got to be out there doing it to have a good idea of what is really going on, let alone how to adjust it to make it work where you are. That's not to denigrate the importance of scholarship or study. It's just to note that they are subject to the same law as any other aspect of military planning: "No plan survives contact with the enemy." There are two more entries in the dispute at this time, and I'd like to bring them to your attention. One is a Ph.D. candidate who has focused on the region and its languages. He thinks MAJ Gant is off his rocker; but read what he has to say. (Hat tip to our friend COL Maxwell.) The other is Professor Andrew Lubin, who is out there following up on MAJ Gant's ideas from the field. He is with the Marines in Helmand Province, and has a report this week at the One Tribe At A Time webpage.
Read the complete post at http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Blackfive/~3/0KbJDIOzPuo/disputes-on-maj-gants-tribal-approach.html
Posted
Jan 18 2010, 03:43 AM
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