There is an excellent article in The New Republic about a course being run in Afghanistan to ensure that our tactical leaders fully understand the concepts of population-centric counterinsurgency and how to implement it in the field. There are a number of anecdotes that illustrate how changing the mindset of our officers and then our troops is vital to success. For one week each month, 130 students descend on Julien to learn about counterinsurgency. Attendees come from every possible background: U.S. and coalition troops of all ranks, ages, and nationalities; State Department and USAID personnel; Afghan soldiers and police; members of NGOs; contractors; Army anthropologists. (I was there in July as part of my research on law in situations of counterinsurgency.).... "How many of you have read David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice?" Lt. Colonel Matt Galton, the deputy director of the center, asked in his Australian accent. Two hands slowly went up. It was not surprising. Though Galula’s book is a--possibly the--classic starting point for counterinsurgency, it was written over 40 years ago and isn’t required reading. More troubling, when Galton asked how many had read the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, only about five hands went up. This was surprising, given how pervasive, even trendy, counterinsurgency has become in policy circles. In the nearly three years since the release of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, its authors have gone on to fame, at least in the public policy world: Nagl appeared on "The Daily Show"; Kilcullen is a frequent television commentator; and Petraeus, the lead author of the manual, is now the head of U.S. Central Command--in charge of the military’s operations in the Middle East. But, despite the coaches’ rise to prominence, most of the players haven’t read the playbook. "I didn’t even know counterinsurgency was a term," Lieutenant Aaron Lewis said of his tour of duty in Iraq in 2004 and 2005. "I felt something was wrong with what we were doing ... but I didn’t know what." I find that sad but not surprising. Despite the fact that COIN is the strategy in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the military has not shifted it's main focus from normal, Big Army training and doctrine to an emphasis on this decidedly civil affairs, sweetness and light strategy. It is foreign to the mentality and culture of combat units. "Security, governance, and development," Captain Mike Barry announced with the ease and authority of a second-tour officer who now spends his days reading about counterinsurgency. "These are the three pillars of counterinsurgency. This is how you win the population." When groups of students assembled around him during the week, Agoglia frequently told them that governance was the most important of the three. "I’m an infantryman telling you that," he joked, "so it must be true!" Yet, on the first day, many of the students chafed upon hearing that they might have to do what the military calls "civil affairs." "We’re not trained to do governance and development," one young officer said. Another chimed in: "Shouldn’t the State Department and others be doing this? This isn’t our job." He is absolutely correct that it is not normally their job, but this is not a direct engagement, hot war. In this case the military must be not just the combat force that kills it's enemies, but the security force that protects the civilians, and in many cases the proxy for a non-existent civilian government. This is done since none exists, but with the plan being to pacify the area enough for the folks whose job it is to do those things to follow on. By the fifth day of the course, the curriculum seemed to be working. The students were more focused on the population and understood that thoughtful planning, non-military operations, and patience were the keys to success. Their mindset had shifted. "It’s been incredible to see the younger officers change their views and build on each day’s lessons,” Colonel Jeanne Arnold, who leads an advisory group to one of the U.S. commanders, told me. "I’ve read a lot about counterinsurgency, but I’m amazed at how fast these guys are picking it up.” Every officer we put into the field with a solid understanding of the tenets of COIN, will serve to inform and recruit others to the cause. It is a culture change, but if we want to win in Afghanistan it is one that needs to happen. We do not have to choose between having a capability to conduct low intensity conflict and major force on force warfare. We need to have both. But given the present challenge and the very real prospect of defeat at the hands of the Taliban and al Qaeda, it is incumbent on us to adapt to the local security, population friendly focus in takes to win with COIN.
Read the complete post at http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Blackfive/~3/BQeaHiiTD6w/teaching-coin-in-afghanistan.html
Posted
Oct 08 2009, 01:54 AM
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BLACKFIVE