For all the rhetoric about Afghanistan being "the 'good' war" and where we should be concentrating the fight we heard during the campaign, it really comes as no surprise to me that politicians, the chattering class, and the liberal left is now pitching abandonment of he effort just when we are seriously considering that which is necessary to turn the fight around. The problem? As usual it has to do with political will. The new commander, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, has done his assessment of the situation and has rendered his report. "The situation in Afghanistan is serious, but success is achievable and demands a revised implementation strategy, commitment and resolve, and increased unity of effort." Read that carefully - two words in particular are aimed primarily at one particular sphere of influence - the political. What McChrystal is saying to the political community is, "I think we can be successful if we follow the revised strategy I've set forward, but without the "commitment and resolve" from the political community to see this through, it will all be for naught." Anthony Cordesman, who was involved in McChrystal's assessment, delivers what I would characterize as a pretty succinct and honest appraisal of why we're in the situation we're in now: The most critical reason has been resources. Between 2002 and 2008 the United States never provided the forces, money or leadership necessary to win, effectively wasting more than half a decade. Our country left a power vacuum in most of Afghanistan that the Taliban and other jihadist insurgents could exploit and occupy, and Washington did not respond when the U.S. Embassy team in Kabul requested more resources. The Bush administration gave priority to sending forces to Iraq, it blustered about the successes of civilian aid efforts in Afghanistan that were grossly undermanned and underresourced, and it did not react to the growing corruption of Hamid Karzai's government or the major problems created by national caveats and restrictions on the use of allied forces and aid. It treated Pakistan as an ally when it was clear to U.S. experts on the scene that the Pakistani military and intelligence service did (and do) tolerate al-Qaeda and Afghan sanctuaries and still try to manipulate Afghan Pashtuns to Pakistan's advantage. Further, it never developed an integrated civil-military plan or operational effort even within the U.S. team in Afghanistan; left far too much of the aid effort focused on failed development programs; and denied the reality of insurgent successes in ways that gave insurgents the initiative well into 2009. Like it or not, Afghanistan has been the second priority when it came to resources. Turning it around is going to take both time and more resources - something, if you read the pundits and politicians today, many are not willing to do. Cordesman says that "most experts" agree that US troop levels in Afghanistan need to be increased by "three to eight more brigade combat teams". But he also stresses that those BCTs would primarily be engaged in training Afghan troops and making them "full partners rather than tools". The need for that training is past critical and was highlighted as a problem when 4,000 plus Marines pushed into Helmand province and only 600 Afghan troops (around a battalion) were able to participate. However Cordesman's last point about civil-military plans is just as critical and just as on-point. These programs are critical and lacking. A big plus up in that area is required to turn the situation around. Militarily, what we must do is "take, hold and keep the Afghan population secure". Classic COIN. Just as important but glaringly lacking at the moment is the other and equally important side of the process:
ecure local governance and economic activity to give Afghans reason to trust their government and allied forces. They must build the provincial, district and local government capabilities that the Kabul government cannot and will not build for them. No outcome of the recent presidential election can make up for the critical flaws in a grossly overcentralized government that is corrupt, is often a tool of power brokers and narco-traffickers, and lacks basic capacity in virtually every ministry. Hamid Karzai is nothing more than the mayor of Kabul in reality. One of the critical tasks we faced and overcame in Iraq was teaching Iraqis at every level how to build those necessary government capabilities and then link them all together in a single functioning entity. While certainly not perfect, it provided a decent basis for governance that they've been able to assess and refine as they've gained experience. That task has yet to be done in Afghanistan. And it may never be done either. Why? Because the "good war" that the left claimed was legitimate and necessary to fight is suddenly neither. We're now treated to daily editorials and op/eds wondering if Afghanistan is Obama's Vietnam or whether we find ourselves in yet another "quagmire". And it is reported that even conservative commenter George Will is preparing to come out against our continued presence there, rationalizing such a pull-out with a foolish solution: “[F]orces should be substantially reduced to serve a comprehensively revised policy: America should do only what can be done from offshore, using intelligence, drones, cruise missiles, airstrikes and small, potent special forces units, concentrating on the porous 1,500-mile border with Pakistan, a nation that actually matters.” Of course such a strategy will secure neither Afghanistan or Pakistan and certainly do nothing at all toward eliminating the al Qaeda threat. Instead it would give the organization a much freer hand in both countries. Politicians have also begun to weigh in with rationalizations for pulling out of Afghanistan that can only be characterized as ignorant. Take Sen. Russ Feingold who claims he was for the war before he decided now to be against it. And, per Feingold, if we only listen to him, we can have our cake and eat it too: We need to start discussing a flexible timetable to bring our brave...
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Posted
Sep 01 2009, 02:23 AM
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BLACKFIVE